This paper describes the research which investigates the effect of earnings management and corporate governance (CG) on economic value added (EVA) in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the fiscal year ending 31 December 2015 to 2017. Earnings management used in this study is accrual earnings management (MLA) as measured by the Modified Jones Model and real earnings management (MLR) as measured by management earnings operating cash flows. CG is measured by the CG index. Data is obtained by purposive sampling process and comes from secondary data both from the IDX and from the websites of each company. The research hypothesis was tested using generalized-least square (GLS). The results showed that accrual earnings management had a positive effect on EVA while real earnings management had a negative effect on EVA. The results also show that CG has a negative effect on EVA if tested together with MLA, but CG does not affect EVA if tested together with MLR. This research is expected to contribute to the existing literature by completing and enriching findings on the effect of earnings management and corporate governance on EVA.
Background
This study investigates the effect of earnings management and corporate governance on economic value added (EVA) companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2016-2018. This research is motivated by the fact that EVA is still one measure of accurate corporate financial performances (Liu and Wang, 2017) . EVA is calculated by subtracting net after-tax operating income with the yield between the weighted average capital cost and investment (Brigham and Daves, 2013) . The numbers used to calculate EVA come from accounting reports which are the main objects of earnings management practices. Therefore, researchers suspect that the results of EVA calculations are influenced by earnings management practices. ICEMA Conventional accounting is used to measure company performance (Allgood and Farrell, 2003; Baily and Helfat, 2003; Neumann and Voetmann, 2005; Peng, 2004 ; Shen and Cannella, 2003) . These measurements are determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require the implementation of the principles of conservatism or prudence in the preparation of financial statements.
EVA is an estimate of the company's economic profit that is used to measure the company's financial performance. The basic concept of EVA is that economic profit is obtained if the business results (return) of the company are higher than the costs of the company's capital (Mahdavi and Rastegari, 2007) . Therefore, EVA is used to measure shareholder value (Kaur and Narang, 2008) .
Earnings management occurs when managers make a judgment in financial reporting and manage transactions to polish financial statements (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) .
Previous research focused on determining whether there is earnings management and identifying the motivation to do earnings management ( Zhang and He, 2013) . Accrual is the main tool for manipulating earnings figures because accruals are one component of profits that are not shown in the current period of cash flow information (Hasan and Ahmed, 2012). Therefore, accruals are used as the main instruments by management to manage earnings calculations (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) . The practice of earnings management has long been carried out.
One of the main motivations for conducting earnings management is a bonus scheme.
Managers who want to get bonuses will avoid accounting methods that report low profits. Managers use accounting profits to determine the amount of bonus, so they tend to choose accounting policies that can maximize profits (Scott, 2015) .
Although the issue of earnings management has been studied for a long time, the application of new accounting standards, which is International Financial Accounting Standard (IFRS) and the issuance of new rules on corporate governance have an effect on the quality of accounting information (Krismiaji, Aryani, and Suhardjanto, 2016) and ultimately EVA calculation based on accounting data. The adoption of IFRS, one of the high-quality accounting standards, will have an impact on the quality of accounting information produced (Krismiaji et al., 2016) . This happens because IFRS uses a principle base and a fair value approach (revaluation model) in evaluating financial statement items. In the past, when companies used rule-based accounting standards that required companies to apply standards according to rules, many companies performed earnings ICEMA management practices, so the implementation of principle-based accounting standards was very open, the possibility of earnings management practices became more prevalent. This condition can affect EVA differently than before. The development of the business environment both on an international and national scale also encourages regulatory agencies to issue several regulations that compel companies to implement corporate governance. The application of the principles of corporate governance is expected to minimize business practices that are harmful to shareholders, which in turn, companies are able to produce financial statements which describe the company's financial performance which is further reflected in EVA.
Based on the conditions above, there is an opportunity to carry out further and indepth research on the effect of earnings management and corporate governance on EVA in the years post IFRS implementation and regulations on corporate governance within the company listed on the Indonesia stock exchange. Therefore, researchers formulated the research questions as follows:
RQ1. How do earnings management and corporate governance influence the economic value added (EVA) companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange?
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

Literature Review.
This study uses agency theory. This theory explains and predicts the behavior of agents and principals. This theory provides a framework for organizing relationships between agents and principals through a contract mechanism that regulates the way principals assign agents by delegating corporate management responsibilities ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The agent is appointed to work for the interests of the principal.
Although between agents and principals are bound to behave cooperatively to achieve their goals, in practice, they have different and even conflicting goals and behaviors (Beaudoin, 2008) . The conflict between them arises when agents and principals have different objectives because agency theory is based on the proposition of separation between ownership and control. This separation will provide incentives for managers to pursue activities that benefit themselves at the expense of the principal's interests. The basic premise of this theory is that if between groups that are related to maximizing their interests, then it is reasonable if the agent does not always act the best for the benefit of the principal. Based on the theory, management may perform actions, including earnings management, which affect financial performance, including EVA, ICEMA Stewart (1991) revised the calculation of residual income and made a methodology for calculating EVA. Parvaei and Farhadi (2013) report that EVA initially produces low predictions for performance measurement compared to measurements using return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) or other ratios. Huynh, Gong, and Nguyen (2013) examined the integration of activity-based costing (ABC) with EVA as an approach to measuring company performance. They prove that the EVA-ABC method is an innovation in management accounting approaches. Burja and Burja (2010) reveal that EVA and management resources influence to each other. Moradi, Ghomian and Fard (2012) indicate that earnings, firm size, ability to develop and non-tangible assets have a significant positive effect on EVA, while the capital structure has a negative effect on EVA. Nikbakht and Moghimi (2011) show that the debt ratio is inversely related to EVA in the metallic non-mineral industry, machine construction, and equipment industry. Accounting theory describes motivations for earnings management, such as mergers and acquisitions (Francoueur, Amar, and Rakoto, 2012), the effect of currency DOI Corporate governance will improve the firm's value since the main purpose of CG is to guarantee companies to operate efficiently and achieve the main objective which is to maximize the shareholder value (Zheka, 2006 ). Bagath and Bolton (2008) explained that effective CG would reduce the control rights granted by shareholders for creditors and managers. CG will improve the possibility of managers to invest in projects with high return rates. The company will be better managed so that the company's performance increases. Based on the description above, the research hypothesis is formulated as follows.
H : Corporate governance positively affects EVA 
Research methods
Variable definitions and measurements
This study used two measures of earnings management, namely accrual earnings management, and real earnings management. Accrual earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals and estimated by the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, 1995) in equation (1) as follows:
ICEMA Where TAC is the total accruals for firm i, for year t scaled by total assets for year t-1; TA is the total assets for year t-1; ΔREV are revenues for firm i, for year t less revenues for firm i for year t-1 scaled by total assets for year t-1; ΔREC are receivables for firm i for year t less receivables for firm i for year t-1, scaled by total assets for year t-1;
and PPE gross property plant and equipment for firm i for year t scaled by total assets for year t-1 and ε is the error term. Discretionary accruals (DA) for year t are estimated as the absolute values of residuals from the cross-sectional ordinary least-square (OLS) estimates of Equation (1). The value of absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) is a proxy of accrual earnings management (AEM). ABSDA is an inverse measure AEM, therefore the lower ABSDA, the higher the AEM.
Real earnings management (REM) is developed by Roychowdhury (2006) (2), equation (3), and equation (4). This study uses one measure of real earnings management, which is cash flow earnings management. Another independent variable used in this study is corporate governance which is measured using the CG index.
The dependent variable in this study is EVA which is calculated by the following formula.
Where NOPAT is net operating profit after tax, WACC is Weighted average capital costs, and CI is equity plus long term liability in the beginning period.
This study used three control variables which are a capital structure (DEBT), profitability (ROE), and the company size (SIZE). This refers to the results of research conducted by Moradi, Ghomian, and Fard (2012) who found that capital structure, profitability, and company size had a significant effect on EVA.
Model Specifications
To test hypotheses 1a and 2, a regression model (6) is used as follows:
To test hypotheses 1b and 2, equation (7) is used as follows
Where EVA is the economic value added for firm i in the year of t, MLA is accrual earnings management for firm I in the year of t, MLR is real earnings management for firm I in the year of t, DEBT is capital structure as a control variable which is calculated by dividing total liabilities with total equity, ROE is a control variable which is calculated by dividing profit with total equity, and Size is the firm's size as a control variable and calculated by log total assets. DOI and a maximum value of 10.39, the MLR data range is not too diffuse so that there is a very small outlier. 
Bivariate Analysis
Pearson and Spearman's correlation between variables is calculated and presented in Table 2 . Testing of the correlation matrix for independent variables in Table 2 shows no correlation coefficient above 0.8. This shows that there is no multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003) . Variance inflation factors (VIF) are also tested and the results are still within acceptable limits. Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis to test the hypothesis. The regression results show that this model 6 is significant (p <0.01) and explains about 17% of the ICEMA of the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variable. Table 3 shows the results of regression analysis to test the hypothesis. F value and
Multivariate Analysis
adjusted of the regression model shows that the multiple regression model is statistically significant. However, there are several differences in the explanatory power of the various types of independent variables as indicated by adjusted . The number of variations described in Model 6 is 17 percent and for model 7 is 28.5 percent.
To test hypothesis 1a Model 6 is used. The variables tested are MLA which are the proxy for accrual earnings management. Table 6 in the Model 6 column shows that the value of the MLA coefficient is -6,477 and significant at the level of 1%. MLA is an inverse measure of earnings management. Therefore, if MLA falls then EVA increases.
The regression results indicate that the value of the MLA coefficient is negative. This means that MLA has a positive effect on EVA. Thus, hypothesis 1a which states that accrual earnings management has a positive influence on EVA is proven and supported by empirical data.
To test hypothesis 1 b Model 7 is used. The variable tested is MLR which are proxy for real earnings management. Table 6 shows that the CG coefficient value is -4.168 and is significant at the level of 1%. This result means that CG has a negative effect on EVA. The column model 7 in Table 6 shows that the CG coefficient value is -1.101 and is not significant. This result means that CG does not affect EVA. Thus, hypothesis 2 which states that CG has a positive effect on EVA is rejected and is not supported by empirical data on research. The results of testing hypothesis 1b which found that real earnings management has a negative effect on EVA is also in line with previous studies conducted by Brown and Higgins (2001) and Kim and Sohn (2013) . Their study found that the cost of capital positively related to REM levels. This means that real earnings management increases the cost of capital. Because the cost of capital is a deduction component in the calculation of EVA, automatically the REM increase will decrease the value of EVA.
Discussion of Statistical Results
Some of the reasons why real earnings management is raising the cost of capital are as follows: (1) 
Conclusion
This study investigates the effect of earnings management and corporate governance on economic value added companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange in 2015 to 2017. The results of the study show that accrual earnings management has a positive effect on economic value added, while real management has a negative effect on economic value added. Corporate governance has a negative effect on the economic value added if tested together with accrual earnings management but has no effect if tested together with real earnings management. With these results, hypotheses 1a ICEMA and 1b are accepted and supported by research empirical data, while hypothesis 2 is rejected and is not supported by empirical data on research.
This study has limitations in measuring corporate governance variables. Although the measurement of the CG variable is done using an index, which is believed to be better because it includes more CG elements, but it is unable to prove the hypothesis.
Therefore future research needs to be carried out using CG measures that are more relevant to the measurement of company performance.
